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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
 
 
We propose an explanation for a traditional puzzle in English linguistics involving the 
use of articles with the nominal modifiers same, identical and similar. Same can only 
take the definite article the, whereas identical and similar take either the or a. We argue 
that there is a fundamental difference in the manner in which a comparison is made with 
these modifiers. Identical and similar involve direct comparisons between at least two 
entities and an assertion of either full property matching (identical), or partial property 
matching (similar). The comparison with same proceeds differently:  what is compared 
is not linguistic entities directly, but definite descriptions of these entities that can be 
derived through logical entailments. John and Mary live in the same house entails the 
house that John lives in is the (same) house that Mary lives in. There must be a 
pragmatic equivalence between these entailed definite descriptions, ranging from full 
referential equivalence to a possibly quite minimal overlap in semantic and real-world 
properties shared by distinct referents. These differences in meaning and article co-
occurrence reveal the sensitivity of syntax to semantic and pragmatic properties, without 
which all and only the grammatical sentences of a language cannot be predicted. 
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No two persons ever read the same book.       
Edmund Wilson 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION   
In 1991 Hawkins proposed an integrated semantic-pragmatic-syntactic theory of various 
ungrammaticalities involving definite and indefinite articles in English in combination 
with other items in the noun phrase.  He demonstrated that certain grammaticality 
distinctions are “extremely fine-tuned to the semantics and pragmatics” (Hawkins 1991: 
434). For instance, a noun modifier that normally carries a uniqueness entailment (and 
thus would require a co-occurring definite article) may on occasion not do so, and the 
indefinite article can then occur grammatically, as in a best buy and a first course in 
German versus *a wisest king (ibid.).  Further contrasts that he was able to account for 
were an only child versus *an only student, a colour like red versus *a colour red, and I 
recalled a sweet little child that Mary used to be like versus *I recalled a sweet little 
child that Mary used to be. This is our starting point in this paper – we use information 
about the grammaticality of definite and indefinite articles with the modifiers same, 
identical and similar to shed light on some semantic and pragmatic properties of these 
items.  We focus on these three modifiers and their respective interactions with the 
articles in English because they reveal some intriguing differences in meaning and 
usage that require a more detailed analysis than was given in Hawkins’ earlier work.  
We will also argue that despite the addition of numerous rich and informative studies 
during the last 25 years concerned with English articles and with these adjective 
modifiers, two essential questions have not been satisfactorily answered, involving the 
grammaticality of these noun phrases on the one hand, and their meanings on the other.
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 First, why is the indefinite article ungrammatical with same (*a same house/the 
same house), whereas both a and the are grammatical with identical (an identical 
house/the identical house), as they are with similar (a similar house/the similar house)?  
We are not aware of any convincing explanation for this in the literature, going beyond 
mere observation and stipulation, and yet it is a rather fundamental fact about the syntax 
of this area of English grammar which does need to be accounted for.  It is also a rather 
surprising fact, since to assert of two or more objects that they are identical seems to 
involve a claim that “the objects belong to one and the same common type, exactly as is 
the case with same” (Hawkins 1978: 251). Hawkins (1978:247-253, 1991) appealed to 
the uniqueness of the ‘type’ of entity to which same + noun refers, with or without the 
uniqueness and referential identity of tokens referred to, in order to explain the required 
co-occurrence with the uniqueness-entailing definite article.  For identical he proposed 
that its meaning involved no such notion of abstract type for house, but instead full 
property for property matching between distinct referential tokens. The selection of 
articles with identical would be based in the usual way, he argued, on whether one of 
the referential tokens of house was or was not unique within a pragmatically restricted 
domain of interpretation (a “P-set”, see Hawkins 1991). We will not continue this line 
of explanation here for the ungrammaticality of *a same but will propose a different 
account that makes no appeal to ‘types’. 
 Second, there are some key differences in meaning and usage between same and 
identical whose theoretical significance has not been fully appreciated in the recent 
literature.  For example, in her insightful and empirically detailed study of same and 
identical Breban (2010) gives numerous examples, including actual corpus data and 
usage statistics, of their use and meaning and concludes that “The postdeterminers same 
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and identical clarify that the hearer can identify the instance by means of a phoric 
relation of identity or co-referentiality”. She adds that the “postdeterminers same and 
identical in fact signal identity of reference by invoking the idea of non-identity: ‘it is 
the same instance and not another one’. The determiner unit conjures up a second 
possible referent, only to deny it and to confirm that the referent the hearer has in mind, 
is the right one.” Her notion of “identity” allows for “generalized” instances of e.g. a 
certain kind of house, following Langacker (1991, 2005; cf. also Breban 2011), in 
addition to strict referential identity and co-reference between tokens of the house in 
question, and she documents a rich array of uses for noun phrases containing same and 
identical. What is missing in her account, however, is an appreciation for the precise 
difference between them. This difference can be seen when one tries to replace same 
with identical in the illustrative corpus examples she gives in Breban (2010). 
 On p.212 (op cit.), for example, she cites the following attested use (her (7.41)): 
 
(1) A dog which plunged 400ft down a mountainside had its fall broken by two 
climbers who had plunged through the same ice hole. 
 
If we replace the same ice hole in (1) with the identical ice hole the reference changes to 
a quite different ice hole from the one that the two climbers had plunged through and 
the sentence will receive a very different pragmatic interpretation:  
 
(2) A dog which plunged 400ft down a mountainside had its fall broken by two 
climbers who had plunged through the identical ice hole. 
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A dog which plunges through one ice hole cannot normally in our world have its fall 
broken by climbers who are in another, albeit “identical”, ice hole. If the climbers were 
formerly in another, identical ice hole and are now somehow in the “same” one as the 
plunging dog, then the sentence may be interpretable and avoid pragmatic anomaly. But 
this contrast makes clear that same and identical pattern differently in English definite 
NPs with respect to their referents, their co-reference and the manner in which “a 
second possible referent” is evoked (Breban 2010:212). Contrary to what Breban claims 
in the quotes above, this second referent is not denied in (2), but is actually asserted. 
Hence whatever similarities and overlaps there are in English definite NPs containing 
same and identical, there are profound differences as well which are not being 
accounted for. 
In earlier joint work with Davidse and Van linden (Davidse et al. 2008), Breban 
also equated same with identical and pointed out that these post-determiners “merely 
emphasise the coreferentiality and inclusive reference conveyed by the primary 
determiners”. This was in line with other studies (Barker 2007; subsequently 
Brasoveanu 2011) that have tried to equate the meanings of the definite article and same 
and to blend them into one. But definite descriptions with same are not used merely for 
the purpose of emphasis or inclusive/unique reference.  They involve instead a form of 
reference that can be best understood by going back to the basic logic of Russell’s 
(1905) theory of definite descriptions and to the kind of pragmatic extension of his 
theory that was developed in Hawkins (1978, 1991).  Hawkins’ (op cit) proposal was 
that the existence and uniqueness of definite referents needs to be interpreted relative to 
different pragmatic sets (his “P-sets”) within a pragmatically structured universe of 
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discourse that can make sense of everyday uses of definite descriptions going far 
beyond the present king of France. 
The anaphoric nature of many definite NPs is well-known and well-documented 
(see e.g. Birner 2013: ch.4), as are their deictic properties (see Schwarz 2009 for a 
particularly interesting recent proposal for describing these in terms of “strong” 
definites).  Many other appropriate uses of the definite article in English, for example 
various “situational” and “associative” uses, have been summarised in C. Lyons (1999), 
in Hawkins (1978, 1991), and in more traditional works such as Christophersen (1939) 
and Jespersen (1949).  What is new in the present study is an explanation for the 
semantically different uses of same, as well as the reason we shall propose for its 
obligatory use with the definite article. Another original contribution is the contrastive 
discussion of the various meaning possibilities for same, identical and similar.  Our 
point of departure is that grammaticality distinctions in article usage provide an 
independent piece of evidence, in the form of syntactic wellformedness judgments, for 
subtle semantic features of these adjectives of comparison. Our claim will be that there 
is a difference in the semantics of the comparison and in what exactly is being 
compared, and that this is what underlies the article co-occurrence differences.  
Briefly, identical and similar in combination with singular nouns refer to a 
single entity (a pragmatically unique one if preceded by the and generally a non-unique 
one if preceded by a) whose existence is entailed, and this single entity is compared 
with a second distinct entity or entities, whose existence is also entailed. The nature of 
this comparison when identical is chosen is claimed to involve full matching of all 
properties between what we can call the ‘direct’ referent of e.g. (I saw) the/an identical 
house, and the second or ‘indirect’ referent or referents, with which the direct referent is 
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being compared. In the case of (I saw) the/a similar house the existence of a direct 
referent is entailed, a second indirect referent or set of referents is also entailed, and the 
comparison is now claimed to involve only a partial match between their respective 
properties. Crucially, for both identical and similar the comparison is between at least 
two distinct entities, the direct referent and the indirect referent, the comparison 
involves either full or partial property matching between them, and the direct referent 
can either be definite (the identical/similar house) or indefinite (an identical/similar 
house). 
Same behaves differently. The comparison does not now apply at the level of 
distinct entities and between direct and indirect referents, as it does for identical and 
similar, since there may be only one entity that figures in the comparison. If I say, for 
example, that John and Mary live in the same house, this is logically equivalent to 
asserting that the house that John lives in is the same house that Mary lives in. What is 
being compared, in effect, is one definite description the house that John lives in with 
another, the house that Mary lives in, and it is being claimed in what is probably the 
most common interpretation that the two are referentially identical. This is the first 
difference between the same house and the identical house.  In John and Mary live in 
the identical house there is necessarily a comparison between distinct houses. The most 
likely interpretation compares the direct referent that John and Mary are claimed to live 
in with some referentially distinct house, the indirect referent. In John and Mary live in 
an identical house John and Mary may live in a single house, the direct referent that is 
being compared with some other, the indirect referent, or they may live in distinct 
houses that are being compared with one another, with full property for property 
matching being asserted between all the houses in question. For the same house the 
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comparison need not involve such distinct referents, direct or indirect, however, and 
does not apply at the level of the items referred to, checking for their matched 
properties.  Instead it involves a more subtle comparison over partially distinct definite 
descriptions, the house that John lives in and the house that Mary lives in, and these 
definite descriptions may refer, we have seen, to just one single entity. 
But there is also another interpretation for John and Mary live in the same house 
in which John and Mary do live in distinct houses and in which the meaning is, for 
example, that they live in the same model in a housing estate, but in different tokens of 
this model. Here the meaning of the same house encroaches on that of identical, and this 
state of the world could be captured by saying that John and Mary live in an identical 
house. This less usual interpretation for John and Mary live in the same house is also 
present in the logical paraphrase comparing definite descriptions, the house that John 
lives in is the same house that Mary lives in (i.e. the same model of house in both 
cases). The interpretation here involves the process of referential “generalization” for 
house that has been insightfully discussed by Langacker (1991, 2005) and Breban 
(2010, 2011). The key point for now is that same permits an interesting variability in its 
interpretive possibilities, it does not require distinct direct and indirect referents like 
identical and similar do, and the comparison that is evoked does not apply at the level 
of distinct referential tokens but rather it applies to partially distinct definite 
descriptions that can be seen in logically equivalent paraphrases of sentences containing 
the same + Noun. We will argue here that the same + Noun involves a comparison over 
alternative partially overlapping definite descriptions, derived through logical 
entailments, and that it asserts a pragmatic (not a logical) equivalence between them, 
along the lines of the house that John lives in is the (same) house that Mary lives in. 
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In what follows we explain this idea further and we exemplify the overlaps as 
well as crucial differences in article usage between same, identical and similar and in 
the semantic interpretations that characterise these expressions. We will also account for 
the fact that same is not semantically vacuous in combination with the definite article. 
Same is a relational term. It has a more restrictive meaning than the definite article, but 
this latter is required in co-occurrence with same because same involves a form of 
double definiteness, a comparison over two definite descriptions, each of which requires 
the, with at least some partial equivalence between them either at the level of their 
referents, or (for non-identical referents) at the level of the semantic properties within 
the respective definite descriptions. This partial equivalence gives the same features in 
common with both similar and id ntical, as we shall see, but crucially the same differs 
from these latter over what exactly is being compared, two definite descriptions with 
pragmatic equivalence in the one case, versus two distinct referential tokens with full or 
partial property matching in the other. Since what is being compared is two definite 
descriptions, and since an equivalence is being asserted between them, the single NP in 
the entailing sentence can be no less definite than the definite descriptions being 
compared, and hence it has to be the same not *a same. The definite article on its own 
captures uniqueness of singular entities in general and in a whole variety of contexts 
(previous discourse, situation of utterance, ‘association sets’ or frames, etc., see 
Hawkins 1991). In order to explain our theory more fully, we need to go back to basics: 
Russell’s (1905) theory of definite descriptions. 
 
2         RUSSELL’S (1905) THEORY OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS 
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Consider the definite description in sentence (3): 
(3) The house was sold. 
According to Russell’s (1905) analysis, its logical translation would be (4) (ignoring the 
semantics of the past tense): 
(4) Ǝx(H(x) & ~Ǝy(H(y) & x≠y) & S(x)) 
i.e. there is an x which is a house and there is no y such that y is a house and 
non-identical to x and x was sold 
 
Example (3) accordingly makes three claims: 
 
(5) (a)  Existence:  there is a house 
(b)  Uniqueness:  there is only one house 
(c)  Predication:  this entity was sold 
 
If sentence (3) is true, then each of the italicised sentences in (5a), (5b) and (5c) will be 
true, and hence (3) entails the conjunction of the italicised sentences (5a)-(5c). 
 The crucial distinction between (3) and the corresponding indefinite description 
(6) lies in the uniqueness claim: 
(6) A house was sold. 
(7) Ǝx (H(x) and S(x)) 
i.e. there is an x which is a house and x was sold 
The truth of sentence (6) requires that there should be at least one house that was sold. It 
is logically compatible with there being more than one such, or with one only, and so 
(6) is logically neutral to uniqueness and does not actually contradict it.  Existence and 
predication entailments are shared between (3) and (6) and hence (3) entails (6) but is 
not entailed by it. 
 For any account of natural language Russell’s theory of definite descriptions 
raises the question: what exactly does it mean for an entity to be unique? There are 
millions of houses out there so how do speaker and hearer co-operate and coordinate 
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their references so as to understand a given unique one on a given occasion, in the 
manner of Grice (1975)? The answer given in Hawkins (1978, 1991) appeals to the 
pragmatic structuring of the universe of discourse and to the existence of pragmatic sets 
(P-sets) within which uniqueness is achieved in everyday discourse. Hawkins (1991) 
also explains why indefinite descriptions are neutral to uniqueness on some occasions, 
but contrast with the on other occasions and “implicate” non-uniqueness (a senator can 
refer to one of the 100 senators of the US senate, but a president cannot refer to the 
unique president of the USA). 
 Consider now the definite article + modifier combinations of the present paper, 
starting with (8), (9) and (10): 
(8) The same house was sold. 
(9) The identical house was sold. 
(10) The similar house was sold. 
Compare (8) and (9) first. The interesting, and at first apparently contradictory, point to 
note about the identical house in (9) is that it makes an existence and a uniqueness 
claim about the house in question in accordance with Russell’s semantics in (4) and (5), 
i.e. that there is some house x and there is no house y non-identical to x. But at the same 
time we have seen that the semantics of identical does assert the existence of some other 
house y non-identical to x (recall example (2) with the identical ice hole)! The apparent 
contradiction is resolved by appealing to a pragmatically more fine-tuned universe of 
discourse within which the semantics of the identical house is interpreted, for example 
the “previous discourse set” shared by a given speaker-hearer pair and containing 
entities that they have talked about (cf. Hawkins 1991). Appropriate usage of the 
identical house can be achieved if this set contains just one house with the property of 
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being identical to a second one whose existence is entailed, i.e. the uniqueness of the 
one is achieved by being the only one within the relevant set that has the property of 
being identical to some other house.  
For the same house we have seen, in John and Mary live in the same house, that 
there does not have to be actual referential distinctness and that John and Mary could 
both be living in a single existing and unique house. This is the interpretation for same 
that appears to merely emphasise Russell’s semantics for the whereby there is a house x 
and there is no other house y non-identical to x. The more explicit and logically entailed 
paraphrase for this is The house that John lives in is the (same) house that Mary lives in 
(the paraphrase goes through both with and without same) which compares and equates 
two definite descriptions, the house that John lives in and the house that Mary lives in, 
each of which requires the.  
Let {Hj} stand for the set of properties associated with house that John lives in, 
and let {Hm} stand for the set associated with house that Mary lives in, and let us 
represent the house that John lives in informally as ‘the x ({Hj} x)’ and the house that 
Mary lives in as ‘the y ({Hm} y)’. The former achieves its uniqueness in the usual way 
by entailing that there is no other y distinct from x of which {Hj} holds, i.e. there is only 
one house that John lives in. The latter achieves its uniqueness also by entailing that 
there is no other x apart from y of which {Hm} holds, i.e. there is only one house that 
Mary lives in. Now, the crucial additional claim made by same is, in the more usual and 
straightforward interpretation for John and Mary live in the same house, that x = y, i.e. 
the unique x of which {Hj} holds is in fact identical to the unique y of which {Hm} 
holds. There is an equivalence between these two definite descriptions that figure in the 
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more explicit and logical paraphrase for this sentence, i.e. between ‘the x ({Hj} x)’ and 
‘the y ({Hm} y)’, resulting in the possible use of same. 
 But the equivalence between ‘the x ({Hj} x)’ and ‘the y ({Hm} y)’ does not 
have to involve the actual identity of x and y for the same to be used appropriately, as 
we have seen. John and Mary live in the same house could mean that John and Mary 
live in distinct referential tokens of a single house model, and this interpretive 
possibility is also present in the logically equivalent paraphrase The house that John 
lives in is the (same) house that Mary lives in as well. This meaning involving distinct 
referents will be pragmatically preferred in a sentence such as The house that John lives 
in was sold and so was the same house that Mary lives in since there is a much more 
direct description in the event that only one referential token is intended, namely The 
house that John and Mary live in was sold, and its absence in … and so was the same 
house that Mary lives in will lead to the inference that the referential tokens are 
different.  The meaning of same is closer to that of identical when the comparison does 
involve distinct referential tokens, as we have seen. More generally, the form of 
equivalence between definite descriptions in logical paraphrases that are entailed by 
appropriate uses of the same is an equivalence in pragmatic referential possibilities, not 
a full logical or semantic equivalence, as we shall illustrate in more detail in the next 
section. It is also an equivalence that requires only a partial overlap between the definite 
descriptions being compared, ‘the x ({Hj} x)’ and ‘the y ({Hm} y)’, either at the level 
of the properties that figure in the definite description, {Hj} and {Hm} etc, or at the 
level of the referents x and y.  
 The semantic and pragmatic analysis of the similar house in (10) proceeds as for 
the identical house in (9). There is an existing and unique house x within some 
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pragmatically defined set and the definite description achieves its uniqueness by being 
the only x in that set with partial property matching to some other referent y whose 
existence is entailed and also possibly within the same pragmatic set, resulting in 
appropriate sequences such as The house that John owns was sold and so was the 
similar house that Mary owns.  
 Notice finally in this section that sentences corresponding to (8)-(10) with the 
indefinite article, namely (11)-(13), involve ungrammaticality in the case of *a same, as 
we have mentioned, and a different semantics and pragmatic interpretation for an 
identical and a similar compared with their definite counterparts: 
(11) *A same house was sold. 
(12) An identical house was sold. 
(13) A similar house was sold. 
The indefinite article is incompatible with same, we claim, because the semantics of 
same involves a comparison and a pragmatic equivalence between two definite 
descriptions, each of which already requires the, e.g. The house that John lives in is the 
(same) house that Mary lives in.  The product of this comparison and equivalence and 
its reduction to John and Mary live in the same house cannot be any less definite and 
less uniquely referring in the single NP, the same house, than it is in the two compared 
definite descriptions the house that John lives in and the house that Mary lives in that 
are being claimed to be pragmatically equivalent (see the further discussion of this in 
the next section). For identical house and similar house the description can be either 
definite as in (9)-(10), or indefinite as in (12)-(13), depending on whether there is a 
unique direct referent with full or partial property matching to the indirect referent(s). If 
no uniqueness in the manner of Russell’s analysis is claimed for the direct referent, then 
Page 15 of 35
Cambridge University Press
English Language & Linguistics
For Peer Review
 
 
16
16 
the indefinite article will be used for identical and similar as in (12)-(13), and it will be 
asserted that there is at least one house (the direct referent) that is fully or partially 
matching in properties to the indirect referent(s). 
3 SAME AND THE PRAGMATIC EQUIVALENCE OF DEFINITE DESCRIPTIONS 
Same is inherently relational and comparative. So are identical and similar. They link 
and compare one entity with another. But they do so in different ways. Our proposal is 
that the comparison with same is between two logically entailed definite descriptions, 
with an assertion of “pragmatic equivalence” between them. This pragmatic equivalence 
can result from the fact that the two definite descriptions have identical reference tokens 
(a single house token referred to by both, for example) or they may have different 
reference tokens but a sufficient sharing of semantic properties combined with real-
world pragmatic knowledge (of models of house, for example, with their distinctive and 
criterial features) to justify being called the same. The comparison made with identical 
and similar is, we claim, more straightforward and less abstract and applies to linguistic 
and real-world entities directly, not to logically entailed definite descriptions of these 
entities. The difference between identical and similar is then one of full versus partial 
property matching between these entities.  The greater variability in the interpretation of 
the same + Noun, which we shall now illustrate, is a consequence of this more abstract 
and linguistically specified comparison between descriptions of entities, as opposed to 
the direct comparison between entities themselves which is characteristic of identical 
and similar. 
 One consequence of this form of comparison with the same is that it allows for 
considerable ambiguity with respect to the unique entity that it refers to. This entity can 
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be realised as one individual token, in the more usual interpretation of John and Mary 
live in the same house. Consider also the more usual interpretation of Mary was wearing 
the same dress as yesterday. Most plausibly yesterday’s dress token worn by Mary was 
also the one worn subsequently. Alternatively there may be different house or dress 
tokens in these sentences, in their less usual interpretations. In the example John has the 
same nose as his father (example provided by Ekkehard König) the normal 
interpretation will be that we are talking about two distinct noses.  
This ambiguity has sometimes been described in terms of token versus type 
meanings (and was so described in Hawkins 1978).  The notion of a type is not 
straightforward, however.  It is often loosely defined in the literature, and its very 
existence has been fiercely debat d (see e.g. Wetzel 2009, Kearns 2010, Bromberger 
1992). Kearns (op. cit.) observes that once we list all the facts about each individual 
token (for example, in the case of US grizzly bears, how each one eats and behaves and 
what it looks like, etc.) and the generalizations about each of them, evoking the notion 
of a unifying type (i.e. the US grizzly bear) seems superfluous. 
In the present context it is not helpful to talk about a “type” meaning for the 
same in John has the same nose as his father, or in John and Mary live in the same 
house meaning the same model of house. This is in part because the same does not 
oblige us to consider all relevant tokens and compare their properties, which is what we 
have to do for identical, checking that all properties are shared. Moreover, if we try to 
impose a “type” analysis on distinct tokens we soon encounter theoretical and 
descriptive problems involving the very definition of the type, what features define it, 
what properties the entities that belong to it must possess, how it is delimited and how 
type membership is determined. These are the kinds of problems for which Langacker 
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(1991, 2005) and Breban (2010, 2011) have proposed an alternative analysis in terms of 
referential “generalization”, an insight that we believe can be incorporated here for 
examples such as John has the same nose as his father.   
What the same invites us to compare is two logically entailed definite 
descriptions, for example the house that John lives in, ‘the x ({Hj} x)’, and the house 
that Mary lives in, ‘the y ({Hm} y)’. The claim made by same is that there is at least 
some equivalence between these two that is pragmatically sufficient for the comparison 
and equivalence to be made. In the extreme case x=y and all the properties of {Hj} will 
be identical to those of {Hm}. This is full logical equivalence between definite 
descriptions and we see it realised when one and the same house token is involved. But 
when there are different house tokens (x≠y) there must then be some equivalence 
between entities at the level of their properties, i.e. between {Hm} and {Hj}, and just 
how much equivalence there needs to be at the property level, in order to describe 
relevant items as the same, seems to be pragmatically highly variable and context-
dependent. That is why we claim that the kind of equivalence between definite 
descriptions that is required, in general, for the appropriate use of the same, may be full-
bodied logical equivalence at the one end between referential tokens and their 
properties, but only a much looser and pragmatically sanctioned equivalence at the 
other, between some of the properties of {Hj} and {Hm}.
2 
                                                            
2
 Notice that the analysis proposed here for the same house extends readily to anaphoric uses in which a 
definite description refers back to a first-mention indefinite. One of our reviewers raises the following 
example: Yesterday I saw a man with a blue jacket on the bus, and today I saw the same man on the train. 
In this discourse the man (on the train that I saw today) is referentially identical and pragmatically 
equivalent to a number of alternative definite descriptions for this man, based on information given in the 
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Consider some further examples that illustrate this variability in the interpretive 
possibilities for the same and that justify our position that the kind of equivalence that is 
required between logically entailed definite descriptions is pragmatic in nature, i.e. an 
equivalence deemed sufficient in context to justify the claim of “sameness” based on 
some sharing at least of referential and/or semantic and/or real world properties, not a 
stricter form of logical equivalence between definite descriptions. 
Consider the following: 
(14) John and Mary saw the same white rhino. 
This example can be interpreted in many different ways depending on the situation 
being described. The speaker may be referring to just one token (a singular entity ‘white 
rhinoi’ that appeared either once or twice and that both John and Mary saw, together or 
on separate occasions) or he could be referring to more than one token of a common 
white rhino species. If it happens to be clear that there is only one such animal in the 
relevant context (in a zoo for example), then this single token will be linked to the two 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
preceding context:  the man I saw yesterday, the man I saw yesterday on the bus, etc. Hence the man on 
the train that I saw today is the same man that I saw yesterday on the bus. There is a pragmatic 
equivalence between two entailed definite descriptions in this example, just as there is with the same 
house in the main text. More generally, recall the important point made by Kempson (1988) that the 
logical form for sentences containing discourse-sensitive items like anaphoric pronouns and definite 
descriptions must of necessity include contextually given information about individuals and their 
properties, in order for truth conditions to be assigned. If we don’t know who the pronoun he refers to in 
context, we cannot assign a truth value to a sentence that contains it. Similarly for the same man, 
alternative logically entailed definite descriptions are made possible by contextual information, and 
pragmatic equivalence between them is then required, we claim, for appropriate uses of the same in the 
usual way.       
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individuals, John and Mary, who may have seen it on one or more than one occasion. If 
this is not clear, on a safari for example, then the interpretation will be quite vague with 
respect to the number of white rhino tokens seen by these two individuals. In fact, 
neither the speaker nor John nor Mary may have a clue whether there was one or more 
than white rhino token that they saw.
3
  The crucial point is that the referential status of 
the same white rhino may be irrelevant or unknowable in a given real-world situation, 
and this example highlights the flexibility and variability that has to exist pragmatically 
with respect to the possible referents of definite descriptions entailed by the same (the 
white rhino that John saw was the same white rhino that Mary saw). When our world 
knowledge is more constrained and there is just one white rhino (in the zoo), this 
indeterminacy is much less. 
With respect to the descriptive content of the definite descriptions entailed by 
the same, in the event that referential tokens are shared (the house that John lives in is 
the same house that Mary lives in) then the real-world properties of {Hj} and {Hm} 
will, of course, be identical too. In the event that referential tokens are not shared (John 
has the same nose as his father) then the normal expectation may also be that the 
properties of John’s nose {Nj} are identical to those of his father {Nf}, and this may 
even be an implicature in the sense of Grice (1975), Sperber & Wilson (1995) and 
                                                            
3
 This indeterminacy is readily compatible with an intensional semantic account, rather than the 
extensional approach developed here. The present paper builds on Russell (1905) (see Section 2) and on 
the pragmatically structured universe of discourse proposed by Hawkins (1978) within which Russell’s 
theory of definite descriptions is interpreted.  For a clarifying summary and discussion of the relationship 
between extensional and intensional approaches to definite descriptions, see Fitting (2015). 
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Levinson (2000), requiring cancellation in different contexts in the event that the 
implicature is not intended, as seen in the following examples involving jackets:  
(15)     (a) John and Bill were wearing the same jacket but for the buttons. 
   (b) John and Bill were wearing the same jacket but for the colour. 
   (c) ?John and Bill were wearing the same jacket but for the style. 
   (d)  *This jacket and this dress are the same. 
Cancellation of the implicature (‘all properties of the coreferential tokens are shared 
with same’) is possible in (15a) and even in (15b).  Two jacket tokens worn by two 
individuals (or by one individual at different times or by one or more than individual at 
different times and places) can qualify as the same, whether or not the buttons are 
property for property identical.  Even the colour can vary, as in (15b). Example (15c) is 
less felicitous, however, since the style of a jacket is a more inherent part of it, and the 
absence of this match renders it less plausible to view one of these entities as 
pragmatically equivalent to the other.  (15d) is completely unacceptable because two 
entities that are as different as a jacket and a dress cannot be judged to be the same. 
 An extreme case illustrating the role of real-world knowledge in sanctioning an 
acceptable equivalence between two definite descriptions at the property level is the 
following.  Every massive California redwood tree begins its life cycle as a tiny seed. 
Comparing a token of each, the fully grown tree and the seed, it would be possible to 
say: These are the same (tree); thereby establishing the link across times between the 
fully grown redwood and the seed that is, despite appearances, the same tree. The 
entities in question are known to change radically over time, but their very different 
appearances at different stages are not sufficient to block the pragmatic equivalence of 
two definite descriptions (the redwood tree that is fully grown is the same tree as the 
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seed) describing exemplars at extreme ends of the life cycle with minimal property 
overlap but a form of identity provided by real-world knowledge. Notice, by the way, 
that we could not say that The California redwood and the tiny seed are identical (nor 
even that they are similar, see section 5), since hardly any of their properties match.  
But we can say that they are the same (tree), because of the time and life cycle link that 
is known to connect the definite descriptions describing these tokens. 
Returning to jackets and the like, notice that whereas different colours may not be 
sufficient to block pragmatic equivalence between definite descriptions for these items, 
they may do so for others.  Compare (16a) and (16b): 
(16) (a)  ?Their eyes were the same except for the colour. 
(b) The two women were the same except for the colour of their eyes. 
In (16a) colour is an important and salient property of any pair of eyes, and one pair 
would not normally be deemed equivalent to another if that feature contrasts.  Two 
women as a whole, however, possess many more properties than their respective eye 
colours, and so the comparison of one woman token with another can overlook this 
particular feature and establish sufficient equivalence between them at the level of their 
properties, despite their different eye colours.  In the more limited context of eyes alone 
colour is too important a difference to render an equivalence plausible. 
Notice finally in this section the interesting compound form selfsame in Modern 
English, which through the addition of the reflexive and intensifier form self to same 
results in preferred readings for the same that stress referential identity and co-reference 
rather than distinct referential tokens: John and Mary live in the selfsame house has this 
preferred interpretation. So does John and Mary live in one and the same house, where 
the addition of one also encourages the single referent interpretation. Interestingly, the -
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self of Modern English himself, herself, etc, was first used in the form of an adjective 
modifier of nouns and written self or sylf  in Old English with the meaning of Modern 
English ‘same’, as in se sylfa God ‘the same God’ (from König & Siemund 1999: 57, 
see also Farr 1905: 18). The cognate form selb- in Modern German still translates same 
in Modern English (see König & Siemund ibid and Gast 2006: 3). For selfsame in 
English, see more generally König & Siemund (2000) and Keenan (2002) on the origins 
of reflexive pronouns in English and on their related intensifier uses (The Queeni 
herselfi was there), and for other lexical overlaps across languages between items 
expressing identity between referential tokens see König & Siemund (2005). 
4 IDENTICAL 
Semantically same and identical seem at first to be close (recall Section 1).  Their 
historical origins are different. Same is inherited in English from Common Germanic 
(via Norse, see Faarlund & Emonds 2014), whereas identical came from French (cf. 
Davidse et al. 2008: 479).  
Identical occurs with both a and the, as we have seen, though the use of the 
latter is pragmatically restricted to cases where there have been previous mentions, as in 
(17a) and also (18b) below.  
(17) (a) Jackie was wearing an identical dress to the one that I was wearing. The 
identical dress caused a lot of trouble at the party!  
(b) Jackie was wearing a similar dress to the one I was wearing. The similar 
dress caused a lot of trouble at the party! 
We mentioned in Section 1 that a central difference between the same and identical lies 
in the number of entities referred to, namely reference to at least two for identical vs. 
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one or more for the same.  For expressions with identical the identity is actually a 
predication (of full property-for-property matching) applied directly to these two 
distinct entities. For the same the comparison is between two logically entailed definite 
descriptions that describe the single or plural referential tokens in question. The co-
occurrence restrictions of articles provide independent syntactic evidence for saying that 
identical does not in fact overlap semantically with same: identical pairs better with 
similar since they can both co-occur with a.  
Identical and similar share a fundamental semantic feature: they predicate their 
description, namely full versus partial property matching respectively, of at least two 
separate entities.  When they occur within referential expressions they maintain this 
plurality of reference. The meaning of identical can be described as universal 
quantification over all the properties of these distinct entities (i.e. all their properties are 
shared).  The meaning of similar involves existential quantification (some of their 
properties are shared).  Plurality of entities is inherent in the meaning of phrases 
containing identical and similar, whereas same occurs in NPs that can have a single 
referent. This contrast can be seen again graphically in the following minimal pair: 
(18) (a) I have just seen the same twin (that I saw yesterday). 
(b) I have just seen the identical twin (to the one I saw yesterday). 
(18a) refers to ‘the twini’ that I have just seen and links this entity to the coreferential 
‘the twini’ that I saw yesterday.  (18b), by contrast, links ‘the twini’ that I have just seen 
to the other, referentially distinct twin ‘the twinj’, that I saw yesterday.  The use of 
identical, which is appropriate and commonplace when referring to twins, necessarily 
involves a referential plurality and a reference to two quite distinct individuals; the same 
twin involves coreference here to a unique one.  Notice, interestingly, that the identical 
Page 24 of 35
Cambridge University Press
English Language & Linguistics
For Peer Review
 
 
25
25 
twin in (18b) is appropriate as a first-mention definite NP referring back to the other 
twin (Yesterday I saw one twin:  Today I saw the identical twin).  This further confirms 
the plurality of reference inherent in identical:  (18b) refers directly to ‘the twini’ that I 
have just seen while at the same time asserting the existence of another ‘twinj’ and it 
acquires its anaphoric definiteness by reference to this other, previously mentioned 
‘twinj’. Since identical, like similar, involves reference to a plurality, these modifiers 
can combine with a to refer non-uniquely to just one of a plural set (an identical twin 
like an identical coat, also a similar coat [to the one Mary was wearing]). In a parallel 
way a prince can refer to one of the princes of England, a senator to one of the US 
senators, a window to one of the house’s windows, and so on (Hawkins 1978, 1991). 
 Consider now some further examples that highlight this difference between 
identical and the same: 
(19) (a) Jane was wearing an identical jacket to the one Mary wore yesterday; in fact, 
it was the same [one]! 
(b) Jane was wearing an identical jacket, but it was not the same [one that Mary 
wore yesterday]. 
(c) Jane was wearing the same jacket, not an identical one. 
(d) Jane was wearing the same jacket that Mary wore yesterday, or rather, an 
identical one. 
In (19a) the speaker first believes that there are two jacket tokens and then realises that 
there was just a single one and so corrects the reference to the same, after first using an 
identical. Example (19b) clearly signals that the jacket in question was a separate token 
from the token in an earlier reference (to the jacket that Mary wore the day before). 
Example (19c) emphasises the singularity of the jacket token, i.e. there was only one 
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jacket, not two that were identical. In (19d) we have the same situation as in (19b), but 
in reverse. The speaker first thinks there was only one token, and then realises that there 
were actually two and decides to correct himself. 
 When the pragmatic interpretation of the same involves distinct referential 
tokens, however, the contrast with identical is much less and both (20a) and (b) can be 
used: 
 (20) (a) Mary and Jane wore an identical jacket. 
 (b) Mary and Jane wore the same jacket. 
In (20a) two distinct jacket tokens are being referred to, and it is asserted that they 
match one another in all their properties, hence they are identical.  (20b) with the same 
has the more usual interpretation that there are again two jacket tokens and not just one, 
as there might be in a circus act with two people in one jacket, and it achieves this 
similar referential effect through the comparison and pragmatic equivalence between 
logically entailed definite descriptions, the jacket that Mary wore is the same jacket that 
Jane wore. It is commonplace in everyday language use for one and the same situation 
to be describable in different ways (e.g. the candle is on the candle holder vs. the candle 
holder is under the candle) and this is what is going on in (20).  A single situation or 
event can be conceptualised and lexicalised in different ways. The manner in which 
similar reference is achieved in (20a) and (b) is also different, as we have seen. 
 Notice that even though identical involves the matching of all properties across 
different tokens in the normal case, a certain latitude in its descriptive meaning is also 
permitted.  The following are appropriate uses of identical even when the sharing of all 
properties is explicitly denied:   
(21) (a) Jackie was wearing an identical dress to mine, except for the colour.  
Page 26 of 35
Cambridge University Press
English Language & Linguistics
For Peer Review
 
 
27
27 
(b) [pointing to a pair of gloves] I bought him an identical pair of gloves, just a 
bigger size. 
Sentences (21a) and (b) are understood as qualifications of, or exceptions to, the full 
property-for-property matching claim, but not as contradictions. Universally quantified 
sentences with all also permit such exceptions without apparent contradiction, as in All 
the boys were having a good time, except for Charlie.  The exception qualifies and does 
not contradict the universal claim made about all the boys, just as (21a) and (b) qualify 
and do not contradict the claim that all properties are shared between the two dresses 
and two pairs of gloves. What we wish to highlight here is simply the difference 
between identical and same with respect to the number of entities referred to, a 
necessary plurality for identical versus a possibly single one with same, as well as the 
manner in which the comparison is made, through direct reference to entities on the one 
hand versus a comparison of definite descriptions on the other. The plurality of 
reference tokens required for identical makes this item closer to similar than to same, 
and this is reflected in their parallel article co-occurrence possibilities contrasting with 
the/*a same. On the other hand the pragmatic equivalence between definite descriptions 
logically entailed by the use of the same may involve a sharing of all referential and 
semantic properties between definite descriptions, or it may involve only a partial 
sharing of these properties (recall the same white rhino and the same redwood tree 
examples above), which means that same can overlap semantically with both identical 
and similar on different occasions of use. 
5 SIMILAR 
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Similar is usually preceded by the indefinite article, except when it is previously 
mentioned and the context allows the use of the definite article (recall (17b)), as was the 
case for identical (in (17a)). Grammatically, similar patterns like identical, therefore. 
Semantically, it differs from identical in that the concept of similarity involves the 
sharing of only some criterial properties and not of all. For example: 
(22) (a) Jackie was wearing a similar dress to the one I was wearing. 
(b) Bill bought a similar car to ours. 
(c) He saw a similar tree to the one we saw. The similar tree was by the orange 
house down the road.  
In examples (22a-c) we have different tokens that share a number of properties (some 
but not all), by virtue of which th y can be referred to as similar to one another. This 
near-identity together with the potential variability with regard to which properties are 
shared and which are not allows for an infinity of similarity descriptions and hence for 
the indefinite article (unless prior reference is available, as in 22c). The same, by 
contrast, does not have a focus on property-matching between distinct individuals but 
rather on the pragmatic equivalence between definite descriptions that are logically 
entailed by the sentence containing the same.   
The reason why the is uncomfortable with similar is because the sharing of only 
some criterial properties makes the existence of other, similar entities inevitable, in 
general, which conflicts with the uniqueness of definiteness. When the nature and 
number of other similar entities can be brought under pragmatic control, as in (22c), the 
definite article becomes possible with similar. The interpretation of the definite 
description in (22c) is relativised to a set of just two trees and because there are just two 
entities in the pragmatic set under consideration, each becomes unique compared to the 
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other (see also Hawkins 1978: 250). This conflict between the and similar is also 
present between the and identical. In contrast to identical and similar, the uniqueness of 
definiteness maps perfectly onto the meaning of same, since same involves a form of 
double definiteness and pragmatic equivalence between two definite descriptions that 
are logically entailed by a sentence containing the same.  Since each compared definite 
description is uniquely referring and requires the, the product of the comparison, the 
same house etc. can be no less definite and uniquely referring.  
 Notice finally in this section that the adjective different is in many ways the 
negative counterpart to similar in English, predicating of two or more entities that ‘at 
least some properties are NOT shared between them’, as in John’s jacket is different 
from Bill’s. 
 
6 CONCLUSION 
 
We have given an analysis for some of the different meanings and uses of the 
semantically related modifiers same, identical and similar in English and accounted for 
differences in their combinability with articles. Same and identical differ with respect to 
the number of referents they compare and the manner of the comparison. With identical 
the comparison applies directly to referential entities: there must be two or more such 
entities, of which the sharing of all properties is predicated in the normal case. This 
feature of identical is shared with similar, though only some properties are now asserted 
to be shared. With same the comparison is more abstract and applies to linguistic 
descriptions of the relevant entities. Specifically same involves a comparison and a 
claimed pragmatic equivalence between two definite descriptions that are logically 
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entailed by sentences containing the same + Noun. Since the entailed descriptions are 
definite, and since there is an assertion of pragmatic equivalence between them, the 
single Noun Phrase with same in the sentence that entails them must also be definite and 
same must be preceded by the, and only by the. Hence the ungrammaticality of *a 
same.   
Identical and similar, by contrast, can both occur with both articles in English 
since their (direct) referents can be potentially non-unique or unique. Despite the fact 
that identical is semantically closer to same in terms of the sharing of all properties (this 
being implicated for same, unless cancelled recall (15), and entailed for identical, unless 
the entailment is explicitly denied, recall (21)), unique identifiability of the referent is 
not a part of the meaning of identical or similar, as it is with same.. There is no 
semantic and grammatical requirement for a co-occurring definite article with identical 
and similar, therefore, as there is for same, and the choice of a versus the will reflect the 
availability or otherwise of appropriate reference tokens in the relevant pragmatic set 
(cf. Hawkins 1991) containing the entities to which the identical house or an identical 
house refer.   
We can conclude that the English articles, and syntactic grammaticality 
judgements involving their co-occurrence, provide a unique insight into both the 
semantics of same, identical and similar, and into the extreme sensitivity of the syntax 
to their semantic properties.  These article+modifier ungrammaticalities pattern like the 
many others discussed in Hawkins (1978, 1991) that are all fine-tuned to semantic 
differences.  It would be impossible to write syntactic rules predicting all and only the 
grammatical sentences of English in this area without the grammar having access to 
these semantic and pragmatic distinctions in some form, as argued in Hawkins (ibid).  
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Since this conclusion is inescapable for this area of English, once subtle details of the 
syntax and semantics of the noun phrase are properly exposed and analysed, it is prima 
face plausible to assume that the same relationship between the syntax and semantics 
holds for all other areas of English grammar, and indeed for the grammars of all 
languages. 
Finally, the quote from Edmund Wilson at the beginning of this paper, No two 
persons ever read the same book, gives us interesting confirmation for the essential idea 
proposed in this paper. On this occasion the negative universal claim in no two persons 
quantifies over as many definite descriptions as there are people reading the relevant 
book: the book in question that the first person reads is not the same book that the 
second person reads and each is not the same book that the third person reads, and so 
on for as many readers as there are of this book. Edmund Wilson’s point is that even 
though people may literally be reading what can be called the same book, they are not 
really doing so since they each bring their own background, knowledge base, historical 
context, opinions, feelings and attitudes to the content, and consequently they can each 
have a very different understanding of, and different reactions to, what they read. 
Putting this in the terms of this paper, there is a pragmatic equivalence between the 
book in question that the first person reads and the book that the second person reads, 
etc, sufficient to justify calling them the same book, but the real-world differences 
between readers and the general context of their reading are so significant as to make it 
a different reading experience for each one.  
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